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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Desirae Amanda Tracy appeals from the district court's order denying her 
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of law enforcement officers' 
warrantless entry into her apartment. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The facts underlying Tracy's motion to suppress, based on the testimony 
of officers during the preliminary hearing and suppression motion hearing, were 
determined by the district court as follows (with references to the record in 
brackets): 
On February 25, 2012, at approximately 9:45 a.m., Boise 
City Police Officer Billie Cox was dispatched to 2834 S. Robert 
Lane, Boise for a domestic disturbance call. [Tr., p.12, L.17 - p.13, 
L.1 _Jf1 1 According to the dispatcher, the calling party reported there 
was a female being thrown in the apartment, there was lots of noise 
and sounds of banging from the apartment. [Tr., p.13, Ls.1-6.] 
According to the caller, there had been prior disturbances and the 
caller was concerned for the children. [Tr., p.13, Ls.7-12.] 
According to the dispatcher, the male had left the residence. [Tr., 
p.13, Ls.13-18.] Officer Cox arrived with another officer, Boise 
Police Officer Kirk Rush. [Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.32, L.3.] 
Officer Cox knocked on the front door. [Tr., p.33, Ls.20-22.] 
Desirae answered the door. [Tr., p.14, Ls.2-5; p.33, Ls.23-25.] 
Desirae told Officer Cox there had been an argument, but that 
everything was fine. [Tr., p.14, Ls.6-8; Prelim. Tr., p.5, L.24 - p.6, 
1 The transcript of the suppression motion hearing will be referred to as "Tr.", 
and the transcript of the preliminary hearing will be referred to as "Prelim. Tr." 
The state requested the district court to consider the preliminary hearing 
testimony in deciding Tracy's suppression motion, and after defense counsel 
stated he had no objection, the court considered the preliminary hearing 
testimony in making its suppression determination. (Tr., p.39, Ls.4-14; see R., 
p.95 ("The preliminary hearing transcript is in the Court file, and the Court has 
reviewed the testimony.").) 
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L.2; p.29, L.21 - p.30, L.1.] Desirae told Officer Cox that her 
husband had left the residence, and that she was there with her two 
children. [Tr., p.14, Ls.6-8; Prelim. Tr., p.5, Ls.2-7.] Officer Cox 
could see one child from the doorway. [Tr., p.15, Ls.4-13.] Officer 
Cox asked for permission to come in and make sure everyone was 
okay. [Tr., p.15, Ls.14-15.] Desirae declined, but volunteered to 
bring the other child for Officer Cox to observe. [Tr., p.15, Ls.16-
18.] Desirae brought the other child, an eight (8) or nine (9) months 
old infant, to the front door. [Tr., p.17, Ls.13-19.] Officer Cox could 
see red marks on the child's face, stomach, and arms. [Tr., p.17, L. 
21 - p.18, L.8.] Officer Rush saw the same red marks. [Prelim. Tr., 
p.6, Ls.8-11.] Officer Cox questioned Desirae about the marks and 
Desirae said the marks were from sleeping and would disappear. 
[Tr., p.18, Ls.10-14.] 
Officer Cox made a decision to enter the residence to make 
sure there were no other injuries or persons in the residence, and 
to make sure the husband was not there. [Tr., p.19, Ls.7-12.] 
There was a back door, and Officer Cox was concerned that the 
husband could have returned. [Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.12; p.19, 
Ls.9-12; p.20, L.25 - p.21, L.10.] Both Officer Cox and Officer 
Rush entered the residence. [Tr., p.19, Ls.14-18.] They did not 
have a warrant. [Tr., p.25, L.25 - p.26, L.2; Prelim. Tr., p.32, Ls.14-
17; p.73, Ls.19-21.] Both saw a marijuana grow operation in the 
upstairs in plain view. [Tr., p.20, Ls.9-20; Prelim Tr., p.8, L.8 - p.9, 
L.1; p.32, Ls.18-21.] The officers did not find other persons or any 
other signs of injury. [Prelim. Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3.] 
Police took photographs of the infant some time later. [Tr., 
p.23, Ls.22-24.] The photographs do not clearly show the marks 
observed by the officers. [Tr., p.25, Ls.6-16.] 
(R., pp.94-95.) 
Tracy was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance 
(marijuana), possession of over 3 ounces of marijuana, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.50-51.) Tracy's husband, Michael Tracy, was also 
charged with similar crimes, and after the two cases were consolidated (R., 
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p.13), he filed a motion to suppress, which Tracy joined.2 After a hearing, the 
district court entered an order denying Tracy's motion to suppress, finding "there 
were exigent circumstances, specifically concerns of injuries to persons within 
the residence, that justified the warrantless entry into the residence." (R., p.98.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Tracy entered a conditional guilty plea to 
(felony) possession of marijuana in excess of 3 ounces, and the remaining 
counts were dismissed. (R., pp.111-118; see generally 12/12/12 Tr.) The district 
court ordered that judgment be withheld for one year and placed Tracy on 
unsupervised probation for that period. (R., pp.113-118.) Tracy filed a timely 
notice of appeal from the district court's order. (R., pp.120-124.) 
2 Michael Tracy's motion to suppress was augmented into the record on appeal 
by this Court's order dated August 7, 2013. At the outset of the suppression 
hearing, Tracy's counsel advised the court that he "would be joining in the motion 
filed by Michael Tracy, [and] that he would not otherwise be filing any briefing." 




Tracy states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in concluding that exigent 
circumstances justified a warrantless entry into Ms. Tracy's home? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Tracy Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of Her Motion To 
Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Tracy asserts the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress, 
contending there were no exigent circumstances in regard to the officers' 
perceived injuries to the baby because: (1) there "was no yelling, no sounds or 
other evidence of arguments or fighting" when officers arrived at the apartment; 
(2) there was "no suspicion that the older child had any injuries[;]" and (3) Tracy 
"gave them a perfectly reasonable and ultimately true explanation" for the red 
marks on the baby. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
Tracy's arguments fail. Application of the law to the facts shows the 
district court correctly concluded that the officers' actions in this case were 
constitutionally reasonable for purposes of both the federal and state 
constitutions. 3 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
3 The district court's Order Denying Motion to Suppress is attached to this 
Respondent's Brief as Appendix A. 
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Legal Standards Applicable To The Exigent Circumstances Exception To 
Warrant Requirement 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently succinctly set forth the applicable law 
in regard to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement as 
follows: 
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
Without a warrant, searches and seizures within a home are 
presumptively unreasonable. Kentucky v. King,_ U.S._, 131 
S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011 ); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163 
P.3d 1194, 1197 (2007). The State can overcome this presumption 
by showing the government conduct fell within one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. King,_ U.S. at_, 131 
S.Ct. at 1856. One such exception exists where exigent 
circumstances "make the needs of law enforcement so compelling 
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). 
A law enforcement officer's reasonable belief of danger to the 
police or to other persons, inside or outside the dwelling, is one 
type of exigency that may justify a warrantless entry. Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 
375, 209 P.3d 668, 672 (Ct. App. 2009). Accordingly, law 
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render 
emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an 
occupant from imminent injury. Araiza, 147 Idaho at 375, 209 P.3d 
at 672 (citing Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006)). The officer's subjective intent is irrelevant; instead, the 
State has the burden to show an officer has an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing a person within the house needs 
immediate aid. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009). 
State v. Ward, Docket No. 40069 (Idaho App. Oct. 22, 2013) (non-final decision). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals also noted in Araiza that, "in several cases, 
we have held that officers are not required to accept the assurances of someone 
who insists that things are fine within a residence when other circumstances 
indicate otherwise." Araiza, 147 Idaho at 376, 209 P.3d at 673; see State v. 
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Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 850-51, 41 P.3d 275, 278-79 (Ct. App. 
2001); State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 17, 27 P.3d 873, 876 (Ct. App. 2001); 
State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 433, 925 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(warrantless entry justified although domestic battery victim told police "that 
everything was now fine, that she had asked Sailas to leave, and that she did not 
need the assistance of the police"). 
D. Tracy Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of Her Suppression 
Motion 
Tracy asserts, "[h]aving seen all the occupants of the home, the police did 
not have any reasonable basis to enter the home because they were concerned 
that the occupants were injured. Even if the police had actually believed that the 
baby was injured ... there was no exigency that would not have allowed them to 
keep the baby with them in the doorway for a few minutes to see if Ms. Tracy's 
explanation of the red marks would prove accurate." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
Contrary to Tracy's argument, based on the information objectively known by the 
officers at the time, their entry into Tracy's apartment was justified. 
In State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 292, 295, 62 P.3d 214, 216, 219 (2003) 
138 Idaho 290, 62 P.3d 214, law enforcement responded to a report of a man 
who was collapsed on his front porch and unresponsive. kl at 292, 62 P.3d at 
216. A neighbor advised the officer that Barrett lived with his wife and two 
children but that he had not seen them that day. kl Because Barrett did not 
respond to questions about whether there was anyone else in the house, the 
officers on scene "proceeded to Barrett's house and identified themselves loudly 
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several times, asking any persons inside to come to the front door." Id. 
"[G]etting no response and hearing nothing from inside," and concerned that 
Barrett's wife and children could be inside and in need of medical assistance, the 
officers entered the residence. kl Once inside, the officers did not find any 
other occupants, but they did find paraphernalia and heroin in plain view. Id. 
On appeal, Barrett challenged the denial of his suppression motion. 
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 293, 62 P.3d at 217. The Court of Appeals upheld the 
district court's order denying Barrett's motion, concluding: 
Under the totality of the facts and circumstances as known to 
the police at the time that they entered Barrett's house, and 
reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, we conclude that there 
existed a compelling need for the police to enter. The state has 
satisfied its burden to show that the risk of danger to persons inside 
the dwelling, as then reasonably perceived by police, constituted an 
exigency justifying that warrantless entry. Here, the state's claim of 
exigency is not a mere pretext for an unlawful entry and search, but 
the police officers legitimately believed, particularly in view of their 
inability to discern the cause of the medical condition affecting 
Barrett, that the life of any occupants of Barrett's house may very 
well have been at stake. Because the police officers were still in 
the process of searching downstairs for persons in need of 
assistance, the exigent circumstances had not ceased to exist 
when [an officer] observed the drug evidence in plain view in the 
kitchen. 
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 294-95, 62 P.3d at 218-19. 
As in Barrett, there was a "compelling need for the police to enter" Tracy's 
residence. Officer Cox testified at the suppression motion hearing about her 
observations of Tracy's baby when Tracy brought the baby downstairs for the 
officer to see: 
And he was - he looked red, like his entire body. He had -
his arms, his stomach, his face, his legs, he had red marks, like 
lines on his body. And, like I said, he had kind of an indentation. I 
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couldn't really tell what was wrong with the baby. But he had 
several marks on his body, and he was very red. 
Q. And what did you think when you saw the child? 
A. It caught me off guard because I hadn't seen - you know, it 
was really from his face down to his leg area where he had red 
marks and lines on him. So I was very concerned as to what 
happened to the baby. 
So then I started asking her, you know, "What's wrong with 
your child?" 
And she said, well, he was sleeping, and, you know, 
eventually those will all disappear. 
(Tr. p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.14.) When asked what she thought when she saw the 
baby, Officer Cox testified: 
I had thought that somehow, you know, if there was a 
physical altercation between two people, being her and Michael, 
that somehow maybe the baby was involved in the middle of that, 
or maybe this was just directed towards the baby. Maybe this was 
- had nothing to do with her. Maybe it was just the baby and the 
male. 
So I - you know, I really - I was just concerned based on 
what I was seeing. I did not feel that a baby would look that way 
after just waking up from a nap. 
Q. Did you think the baby was injured? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p.18, L.18-p.19, L.5.) 
Additionally, Officer Rush testified at the preliminary hearing to seeing the 
same type of apparent injuries on Tracy's baby as Officer Cox, as the following 
colloquy shows: 
Q. And what did you notice about that child? 
A. He appeared to have several abrasions on his body. 
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Q. Was that immediately apparent to you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when you say abrasions, what do you mean? 
A. Red marks. Body appeared to have several red marks, right 
side of his head appeared to have what appeared to be injuries to 
them, causing us to be concerned about the welfare of the child 
and anybody else who may be in the residence. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.51, L.16- p.52, L.1.) When asked why he entered the residence, 
Officer Rush testified: 
Due to the (inaudible) of the situation, when we receive a call 
stating that there's possibly some type of domestic disturbance 
going on they believe that was physical, the person who answers 
the door appears to be upset, somewhat nervous and reluctant to 
let us inside of the residence, there's a child that appears to have 
some types of injuries to it, it would be negligent on our part not to 
enter that residence to check on the welfare of anybody else who 
may be in it and also the possible apprehension of a suspect who 
may be inside as well. 
Q. And so, in essence, it was for the safety of the individuals in 
the home that you had entered the residence? 
A. Correct, yes. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.53, L.13 - p.54, L.1.) 
Based on the testimony presented at both the preliminary hearing and the 
suppression motion hearing, the district court determined it was reasonable for 
the officers to enter Tracy's home in order to find out if any other persons were 
injured or in need of medical attention, explaining: 
[T]the Court concludes that exigent circumstances existed such that 
the warrant requirement was excused. Looking at the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officers at the time of entry, and the 
reasonable inferences drawn from those circumstances, the court 
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finds that there was a compelling need for the police to enter the 
residence immediately. 
A neighbor reported a physical altercation to a 911 operator, 
stating that a female was being thrown and reporting loud sounds. 
The neighbor reported past incidents of the same sort involving the 
same couple. One of the police officers spoke to the reporting 
party over the phone before arriving at the residence. While 
Desirae attempted to assure the officer that there was no need for 
police concern, other circumstances indicated there were reasons 
for concern. While Desirae certainly had the right to decline to let 
the police enter, her refusal to allow the officer into the residence 
increased the concern that there may have been others needing 
help inside, or that she did not want the police to know that her 
husband had returned. The officers both observed what appeared 
to be recent injuries on an infant. And while these marks were not 
reflected in the later photographs, the court must evaluate the facts 
known or concerns that existed at the time the officers decided to 
enter the residence. Based upon the foregoing, the court 
concludes that there were exigent circumstances, specifically 
concerns of injuries to persons within the residence, that justified 
the warrantless entry into the residence. Accordingly, the motion to 
suppress is denied. 
(R., p.98.) 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court correctly found 
that the officers had a legitimate basis for concern that other people inside 
Tracy's apartment could have been injured and in need of medical assistance. 
Tracy has failed to demonstrate that law enforcement acted unreasonably 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
by entering her home to ensure the safety of whoever might have been injured. 
Because the officers were lawfully in the process of ascertaining the well-being of 
any persons inside the apartment when they noticed the marijuana plants and 
drug paraphernalia, there was no federal or state constitutional violation requiring 
11 
suppression of any evidence. Tracy has therefore failed to demonstrate error in 
the district court's denial of her motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Tracy's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of November, 2013, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
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DEBORAH WHIPPLE 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock 

































NOV 2 7 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cle 
Sy MERSIHA TAYLOR 
DePUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICL4-L DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Desirae Tracy and Michael Tracy, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2012-0002900 
Case No. CR-FE-2012-0002901 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Before the Court is the motion to suppress filed by Defendants Desirae Tracy ("Desirae") 
and Michael Tracy ("'Michael") (collectively the "Tracys"). For the reasons set forth below, the 
motion will be denied. 
Background and Prior Proceedings 
On February 25, 2012, at approximately 9:45 a.m., Boise City Police Officer Billie Cox 
was dispatched to 2834 S. Robert Lane, Boise for a domestic disturbance call. According to the 
dispatcher, the calling party reported there was a female being thrown in the apartment, there 
was lots of noise and sounds of banging from the apartment. According to the caller, there had 
been prior disturbances and the caller was concerned for the children. According to the 
dispatcher, the male had left the residence. Officer Cox arrived with another officer, Boise 
Police Officer Kirk Rush. 
Officer Cox knocked on the front door. Desirae answered the door. Desirae told Officer 
Cox there had been an argument, but that everything was fine. Desirae told Officer Cox that her 











husband had left the residence, and that she was there with her two children. Officer Cox could 
see one child from the doorway. Officer Cox asked for permission to come in and make sure 
everyone was okay. Desirae declined, but volunteered to bring the other child for Officer Cox to 
observe. Desirae brought the other child, an eight (8) or nine (9) months old infant, to the front 
door. Officer Cox could see red marks on the child's face, stomach, and arms. Officer Rush saw 
the same red marks. Officer Cox questioned Desirae about the marks and Desirae said the marks 
were from sleeping and would disappear. 
Officer Cox made a decision to enter the residence to make sure there were no other 


















back door, and Officer Cox was concerned that the husband could have returned. Both Officer 
Cox and Officer Rush entered the residence. They did not have a warrant. Both saw a marijuana 
grow operation in the upstairs in plain view. The officers did not find other persons or any other 
signs of injury. 
Police took photographs of the infant some time later. The photographs do not clearly 
show the marks observed by the officers. 
Desirae and Michael have been charged with manufacturing marijuana, a felony, 
possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. 
There was a preliminary hearing on April 18 and 20, 2012. The preliminary hearing transcript is 
in the Court file, and the Court has reviewed the testimony. 
On July 16, 2012, Tracy filed a motion to suppress. Michael has joined in the motion. 
The state filed an opposition on September 13, 2012. Tracy filed a brief in support of the motion 
to suppress on _September 7, 2012. The Court conducted a hearing into the motion to suppress on 
October 31, 2012. The state was represented by Bi'ent A. Ferguson, Deputy Ada County 




























Prosecuting Attorney. Tracy was represented by Deputy Ada County Public Defender Ransom 
J. Bailey. Michael was represented by Randall S. Barnum. Officer Cox testified at the hearing. 
The Court took the matter under advisement. 
Discussion 
It is settled that "[t]he Fourth Amendment, as well as Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution, protect the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371,374,209 PJd 668, 
671 (Ct. App. 2009). The entry into a home by police acting without a search warrant is 
presumed to be unreasonable. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,586, 100 S.Ct. 
1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 650 (1980) and State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,431, 925 P.2d 
1125, 1130 (Ct.App.1996)). 
However, there are a few recognized exceptions to this presumption. Id ( citing Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2042-43, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 587-88 
(1971) and State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218,984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999)). The state bears the 
burden to show that a warrantless search fits within one of these exceptions. Id (citing State v. 
Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 470, 197 P.3d 327,331 (Ct.App.2008)). 
One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is the existence of "exigent 
circumstances." State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 16, 27 P.3d 873, 875 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) and State v. 
Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224,225 (1993)). The risk of danger to other persons inside a 
residence can constitute such an exigency justifying a warrantless entry. State v. Barrett, 138 
Idaho 290,294, 62 P.3d 214,218 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 
847, 849-50, 41 P.3d 275, 278-79 (Ct.App.2001)). 





























The standard for the existence of exigent circumstances is "when the facts known to the 
poHce at the time of the entry, along 'with reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, demonstrate a 
'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant."' State v. Araiza, 14 7 Idaho 
371, 374, 209 P.3d 668, 671 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Pearson~Anderson, 136 Idaho at 849, 41 
P .3d at 277); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 4 32, 434, 925 P .2d 1121, 1133 (Ct.App.1996). While it 
is appropriate for a court to scrutinize any claim of exigency to ensure against pretext searches, 
the court must also strive to avoid "second-guessing police decisions made in legitimate belief 
that life may very well be at stake." Pearson-Anderson, above at 849, 41 P.3d at 279 
(Ct.App.2001). 
When evaluating the existence of exigent circumstances, a police officer is not required 
to "accept the assurances of someone who insists that things are fine within a residence when 
other circumstances indicate otherwise." Araiza above, at 376, 209 P.3d at 673 (citing State v. 
Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 850-51, 41 P.3d 275, 278-79 (Ct.App.2001); State v. 
Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 17, 27 P.3d 873, 876 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho at 435, 
925 P.2d at 1134. 
Finally, if police are otherwise conducting a lawful activity, they may seize evidence in 
plain view. State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293-94, 62 P.3d 214, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Applying these considerations to the facts of this case, the Court concludes that exigent 
circumstances existed such that the warrant requirement was excused. Looking at the totality of 
the circumstances known to the officers at the time of entry, and the reasonable inferences drawn 
from those circumstances, the court finds that there was a compelling need for the police to enter 
the residence immediately. 




























A neighbor reported a physical altercation to a 911 operator, stating that a female was 
being thrown a.rid reporting loud sounds. rne neighbor reported past incidents of the same sort 
involving the same couple. One of the police officers spoke to the reporting party over the phone 
before arriving at the residence. While Desirae attempted to assure the officer that there was no 
need for police concern, other circumstances indicated there were reasons for concern. While 
Desirae certainly had the right to decline to let the police enter, her refusal to allow the officer 
into the residence increased the concern that there may have been others needing help inside, or 
that she did not want the police to know that her husband had returned. The officers both 
observed what appeared to be recent injuries on an infant. And while these marks were not 
reflected in the later photographs, the court must evaluate the facts known or concerns that 
existed at the time the officers decided to enter the residence. Based upon the foregoing, the 
court concludes that there were exigent circumstances, specifically concerns of injuries to 
persons within the residence, that justified the warrantless entry into the residence. Accordingly, 
the motion to suppress is denied. 
Conclusion 
The Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this )-7 ---day of November, 20 ~-~~~ 
atrick H. Owen 
District Judge 
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